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Abstract 
 The literature concerning the effect of tariffs on the inter-industry wage premium has 
not addressed the role of total factor productivity (TFP) in determining both the wage 
premium and tariffs. This omission invalidates the use of the pre-reform tariff level as an 
instrument for the change in tariffs. Based on an analysis of Colombian data, I find that 
including TFP in the estimated model of the effects of tariffs on the wage premium leads to a 
36% decrease in the effect of tariffs on the inter-industry wage premium relative to the model 
that omits TFP. More specifically, a ten percentage point decrease in tariffs reduces the wage 
premium by 1.1%. This finding suggests the importance of using policies that boost 
productivity to offset the effect of tariffs on the wage premium. 
 
JEL codes: F1, F16, J3, O15 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Recent experience with trade liberalization in developing countries has raised 
concerns about the impact of trade liberalization on wage inequality. In particular, there have 
been concerns about changes in labor market outcomes such as returns to skills and the inter-
industry wage premium (hereafter called the wage premium), which is the part of the wage 
that is explained by the characteristics of the worker’s industry of affiliation (after controlling 
for the worker’s characteristics). The empirical evidence provided by Gonzaga et al. (2005) 
for Brazil, Cragg and Epelbaum (1996) for Mexico, Galiani and Sanguinetti (2003) for 
Argentina, and Attanasio et al. (2004) for Colombia suggests that the observed changes in the 
skill premium (another way of expressing returns to skills) do not entirely explain the 
increase in wage inequality.
1
 As a result, some researchers started to explore the idea that 
trade policy may affect wage inequality through other channels such as the wage premium. 
For instance, changes in the wage premium can result in increased inequality if, as a result of 
trade policy changes, the wage premium decreases less in skill-intensive industries than in 
industries that rely primarily on unskilled workers 
The wage premium has drawn a lot of attention in this context because the trade 
liberalization conducted in countries like Colombia, Mexico, and India not only decreased 
overall protection levels, but also altered protection levels differently across industries. 
Interestingly, there is mixed evidence concerning the effect of tariffs on the wage premium: 
no effect for Mexico (Feliciano, 2001), a positive effect for Colombia (Goldberg and 
Pavcnik, 2005), and a negative effect for India (Mishra and Kumar, 2008).  
 A weakness of this literature is that it has ignored the role of total factor productivity 
(TFP) in determining both the wage premium and tariffs. Bartel and Sicherman (1999) found 
                                                 
1
 Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) provides a good survey of this literature. 
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that for the U.S., the higher the industry TFP, the higher the wage premium enjoyed by its 
workers. In addition, Karacaovali (2011) presented evidence for Colombia that industry TFP 
and its anticipated future changes are correlated with contemporaneous import tariffs. This 
means that the instrument used for the change in tariff level (the pre-reform tariff level) is 
correlated with the current TFP level, which is included in the error term. Hence, the 
instrument is invalid and the current methodology provides inconsistent estimates of the 
effects of tariff on the wage premium. 
To address this weakness in the current literature, I use the Colombian data set in 
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) to examine whether trade liberalization affects the inter-
industry wage premium when the impact of TFP on trade policy and on the wage premium 
has been taken into account.  I also estimate the magnitude of the bias in the Colombian case 
that is due to their failure to consider this source of endogeneity.  
I find that TFP is an important determinant of the wage premium in the estimated 
model, with a 10% increase in TFP implying a 1.6% increase in the wage premium. The 
estimated effect of a 10 percentage point decrease in tariffs is a 1.1% reduction in the wage 
premium, which is about 36% less than the result obtained when TFP is omitted. My 
estimates also indicate that as an included instrument, TFP has a positive correlation with the 
change in tariffs, indicating that it is an important time-varying factor in the import tariff 
setting. 
These findings are significant because, according to Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005), 
industries that have the largest share of unskilled workers suffered the largest tariff cuts, 
which means that in principle, trade liberalization increased the skilled-unskilled wage 
inequality through changes in the wage premium.  However, my results indicate that there 
could be a different outcome if the role of productivity were considered. Suppose these same 
industries presented increases in TFP that were sufficiently large so as to counterbalance the 
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effect of the tariffs, then inequality would be reduced. The implication for policy makers is 
that they should adopt policies that boost productivity as a tool to reduce the increase in 
inequality that occurs through the wage premium.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I present a stylized 
model of wage premium setting and discuss the methodological problems of previous studies 
caused by their omission of TFP. The data used in the empirical analysis are described in 
section 3. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 5 summarizes the 
findings and presents conclusions. 
 
2. Methodology 
The literature (e.g. Krueger and Summers, 1988) defines the industry wage premium 
as the share of the worker’s wage that is explained by the industry’s characteristics after 
controlling for the worker’s observable characteristics. Although there is no consensus, the 
two most commonly cited reasons for the existence of an industry wage premium are 
different industry-level productivity levels due to industry-specific inputs, and industry rents 
that arise from imperfect competition in the output market. These industry rents may be 
affected in the short and medium term by trade liberalization, as discussed in Goldberg and 
Pavcnik (2005), and they induce wages to be higher than the market average due to rent 
sharing, as shown by Blanchflower et al. (1996) and Hildreth and Oswald (1997), who used 
firm-level data for U.S. labor markets.  
 
2.1 A Simplified Model of the Wage Premium 
To assess the effects of trade liberalization on the wage premium, I present a 
simplified representative firm model in which the wage premium is due to industry rent 
sharing in a small open economy. I assume that the capital stock is fixed in the short and 
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medium run, thus representing a fixed cost (fj). This assumption is equivalent to assuming 
that capital is sector specific for the time horizon considered here, and allows for the 
existence of positive profits in equilibrium. 
Let pjt be the price of the good produced in industry j at time t. It is a function of the 
import tariff (jt)
 2
, in the sense that as the import tariff decreases, the output price faced by 
the domestic representative firm decreases (pjt/jt > 0). The profit maximization problem 
faced by industry j representative firm in the short-run is 
                    (       )  (      
   
   
)          (1) 
where Y(Ajt, Ljt) is the production function that depends upon Ajt, which is the total factor 
productivity (TFP), and the number of workers (Ljt), which is adjustable over time; wt is the 
average wage paid in the economy, which can be seen as the worker outside option; and jt is 
the workers’ share of industry j rents at time t, which can also be thought of as the workers’ 
bargaining power. So, the industry wage premium received by a worker at industry j at time t 
is given by wagepremiumjt  jtjt/Ljt. Let Y(Ajt, Ljt)=AjtL

jt , and in order to have an interior 
solution 0<<1 is needed. Solving the profit maximization problem, and plugging the 
demand for labor back into equation (1), we obtain the profit function as described by 
equation (2): 
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Then, we can see from equation (3) that the wage premium depends on the price of 
the good produced and on the TFP (Ajt):  
              
     
 
   
     
(     
 (   )           
  
     )   (3) 
                                                 
2
 In a monopolistic competition framework, one can also model the increase in competitiveness induced by trade 
liberalization as a shock to the price-elasticity of demand for output, i.e. more competitiveness results in a more 
elastic demand, and as a result, a lower markup. 
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The level of competitiveness is affected by trade policy through a decrease in import 
tariffs, which forces a decrease in domestic prices
3
, and implies a decrease in industry rents 
that is shared among the factors of production
4
, as shown in equation (4).  
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 The result from equation (4) relies on the assumption that firms cannot influence the 
tariff level, in other words, they cannot lobby government to choose a tariff level that 
maximize their profits. In the next subsection, I relax this assumption and explore its 
consequences on the current methodology used to estimate the effect of tariffs on the wage 
premium. 
 
2.2 Current methodology and its shortcomings 
 Empirically, this relationship between trade liberalization and the wage premium has 
been assessed based on the fact that in several countries trade liberalization led to a decrease 
in tariffs that was not uniform across industries. This changed the protection pattern across 
industries, which can be used to identify the relationship between the wage premium and 
import tariffs. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) applied this methodology to estimate the effect 
of tariffs on the wage premium using data from the Colombian trade liberalization episode 
that started in the 1980s,
5
 as shown in equation (5): 
wagepremiumjt = α+jt+δj+θt+errorjt      (5) 
                                                 
3
 Evidence that a decline in tariffs implies lower markups was found by Harrison (1994) for Cote d’Ivoire, 
Levinsohn (1993) for Turkey, and Currie and Harrison (1997) for Morocco. 
4
 In addition, more competition might change the bargaining power of unions and/or shift their focus from 
wages to job security, hence decreasing their share of the industry rents and therefore reducing the wage 
premium. But this channel is subject to the specific wage negotiation framework of each industry and country. 
5
 Trade liberalization in Colombia started when President Virgilio Vargas took office in 1986 and was 
completed by his successor President Cesar Gaviria by 1992. This reform consisted of a large decrease in all 
tariffs across all industries (generating a large decrease in average tariff) and a removal of almost all non-tariff 
barriers. 
 7 
where jt is the Colombian import tariff for industry j in year t. The use of industry (δj) and 
year (θt) fixed effects makes the within-industry variation the source of identification of , 
which suggests the use of clustered standard errors at the industry level. 
 Changes in tariffs across industries have received a great deal of attention in the 
literature on the political economy of trade protection. This research provides both a 
theoretical basis (Grossman and Helpman, 1994, and Karacaovali, 2011) and empirical 
support (Trefler, 1993, Goldberg and Maggi, 1999, and Karacaovali, 2011) for the idea that 
some characteristics of the industry (e.g. market concentration, share of unskilled workers) 
are taken into account when setting tariffs. This means that if some of these characteristics 
also influence the wage premium, the current tariff level becomes an endogenous variable. 
For instance, a higher wage premium in a given industry might induce its workers to lobby 
against trade liberalization. A possible time-variant political economy factor is union activity. 
Fortunately, this does not appear to be the case, based on anecdotal evidence in Edwards 
(2001) suggesting almost no union activity in Colombia. Thus, in my theoretical model, I 
assume jt = j. Time-invariant industry characteristics that affect tariff setting can be 
controlled by adding industry fixed effects (δj) to the estimated model.  
 As in many developing countries, Colombia’s trade reforms were accompanied by 
other reforms.
6
 There was a labor market reform in 1990 that reduced dismissal costs and 
introduced a new severance payment system. Banking system reforms in the early 1990s 
were aimed at liberalizing deposit rates, extinguishing credit subsidies, and modernizing 
capital markets. Moreover, foreign direct investment restrictions were greatly reduced in 
1991, when multinational companies were basically given the same treatment as Colombian 
firms. Finally, in 1993, there was a major change in the social security system. These 
reforms, which affected all industries equally, underline the importance of including year 
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 See Kugler (1999) and Eslava et al. (2004) for details about Colombia’s economic reforms. 
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effects (θt) in the empirical specification, which would also account for business cycle effects 
on both tariff and wage premium setting. It is possible that the reforms affected industries 
differently, in which case the industry effects will capture this variation.  
 Nevertheless year and industry effects do not account for industry-level variables that 
change over time and that affect tariffs and the wage premium simultaneously. Goldberg and 
Pavcnik (2005) recognized this shortcoming and suggested addressing it by estimating the 
first difference of equation (5) with two-stage least squares using instruments for the change 
in tariffs. 
The instruments they chose are the 1983 (pre-reform) tariff level and its interactions 
with the exchange rate and the coffee price. The rationale for this choice is that the 1983 tariff 
level happens to be proportional to the tariff cut at the industry level, i.e. the higher the 1983 
tariff in a given industry, the larger the magnitude of the decrease in the tariff for this industry 
under trade liberalization, this negative correlation is clearly depicted in Figure 1. The use of 
the interactions of tariffs with the real exchange rate and coffee prices (the most important 
Colombian export product) is motivated by the fact that in designing Colombia’s trade 
reform, trade balance levels were taken into account to prevent a Balance of Payments crisis. 
More specifically, the idea is that exchange rate devaluations, which induce smaller imports 
and larger exports, would lead to a larger decrease in tariffs, and increases in coffee prices, 
which generate larger export revenues, would also lead to a larger decrease in tariffs. 
But there is still a problem with the strategy adopted by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005): 
it ignores the role of productivity in the determination of both the wage premium and the 
tariff. This is a problem because an increase in industry productivity (TFP) leads to an 
increase in the wage premium, as shown in equation (6):
7
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 For example, Bartel and Sicherman (1999) found empirical evidence of a positive correlation between TFP and 
the wage premium in the U.S. In the Colombian manufacturing industries sample used in this paper, the simple 
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This fact alone would not pose an econometric problem if the tariff and TFP were not 
correlated. But this is clearly not the case, since there is a growing literature concerning the 
effect of trade liberalization on industry and firms’ productivity levels. In particular, a 
decrease in import tariffs was found to increase TFP in Chile (Pavcnik, 2002), Brazil 
(Ferreira and Rossi, 2003), India (Krishna and Mitra, 1998, and Topalova, 2004), and 
Colombia (Karacaovali, 2011). 
Overall, while on the one hand trade liberalization decreases the rents to be shared 
and then decreases the wage premium (direct effect), on the other hand trade liberalization 
may boost productivity, which increases the wage premium (indirect effect). This means that 
in the current methodology the total effect of trade liberalization on the wage premium is 
ambiguous. And this could be the reason behind the difference in the sign of the tariff 
coefficient, for instance a positive effect for Colombia (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2005) and a 
negative effect for India (Mishra and Kumar, 2008). 
 Karacaovali (2011) presents a theoretical model in which industry TFP is an important 
political economy factor that affects tariff setting. This is because under the plausible 
assumption of a small price elasticity of supply, the higher the industry TFP, the greater the 
benefits from protection that accrue to firms in that industry, and therefore the greater the 
incentives to lobby the government for more protection. Karacaovali (2011) further finds that 
in the context of a trade liberalization that is similar to the one adopted by Colombia, the 
extent of industry-level liberalization (the change in tariffs) depends positively upon the 
change in its productivity, which means that future tariffs may be influenced by anticipated 
changes in productivity. 
                                                                                                                                                        
correlation between the natural logarithm of TFP and the wage premium is 0.373, and the correlation between 
the first-difference of the same variables is 0.45. 
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On the empirical side, Karacaovali’s (2011) estimates using Colombian data support 
his theoretical predictions. He examines the correlation between tariffs and TFP over time, 
and finds a statistically significant correlation between future TFP and present tariffs, and that 
there is autocorrelation in TFP over time.
8
 
From the discussion above, it is clear that the bias of the tariff coefficient resulting 
from the omission of TFP should be positive, due to the positive correlation of the tariff with 
TFP. Once TFP is included in the estimated model, the estimated coefficient of the tariff 
should decrease in magnitude. Second, the exclusion restriction for using the 1983 tariff level 
as an instrument for tariff changes is not met. This is because the pre-reform (1983) tariff 
level takes into account the industry-level TFP at that time, which in turn is correlated with 
the current TFP level (which is part of the error term due to the omission of TFP in equation 
(5)). This means that the instrument (1983 tariff level) and the error term are correlated, 
making the instrument invalid.  
 
2.3 Incorporating Productivity into the Estimated Model 
To address the problems described earlier and obtain consistent estimates of the 
impact of tariffs on the wage premium, TFP has to be incorporated into the estimated model
9
. 
This eliminates the problem of correlation between the instrument (1983 tariff level) and the 
error term. The estimated model then becomes equation (7), where  indicates time 
difference:  
wagepremiumjt = jt+γlog(TFPjt)+θt+Δerrorjt    (7) 
                                                 
8
 Using Colombian data, Fernandes (2007) also found that TFP has autocorrelation, with one reason for this 
behavior being the econometric technique used to estimate TFP. 
9
 The introduction of the productivity variable on the right-hand side can generate reverse causation if firms pay 
efficiency wages (Krueger and Summers, 1988) to avoid shirking, which means they pay wages higher than the 
worker outside option. This causes the workers’ productivity to increase, as a result TFP becomes an 
endogenous regressor. However, good instruments for TFP are not available to investigate this hypothesis. 
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3. Data 
 I use two data sets for the empirical analysis. The first is the Colombian data set in 
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005), from which I use the estimated wage premium and its 
respective estimated standard error, import tariff, real exchange rate, and coffee price 
variables. The second data set comes from Eslava et al. (2004), and consists of industry-level 
TFP. 
 
3.1 The Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) Data Set 
 To estimate the wage premium, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) used worker-level data 
from the Colombian National Household Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Hogares) conducted 
by the Colombian Statistical Agency (DANE) in 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 
and 1998.
10
 This survey, which is a repeated cross-section covering urban areas of Colombia, 
contains questions about demographic characteristics (age, gender, marital status, education, 
literacy, etc.), job type, industry of employment at the 2-digit ISIC level (total of 33 
industries, with nine in the manufacturing sector), and region of residence. Following 
Krueger and Summers (1988), Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) estimated the wage premium 
separately for every year of the sample using the following specification:  
ijt
j
jtijtHijtijt
mwagepremiuIw    *)log( H   (8) 
where log(wijt) is the natural logarithm of the hourly wage received by the worker i affiliated 
with industry j at time t. Hijt is a vector that contains worker’s age, age squared, a male 
indicator, a married indicator, a head of household indicator, completed elementary, 
secondary and college education indicators (the omitted category is incomplete elementary 
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 Because the data are for every other year, in this paper the first difference of a variable should be interpreted 
as the difference between the variable at year t and the variable at year t-2. 
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education), a literacy indicator, a residence in Bogotá indicator, occupational indicators, and 
job type indicators. Iijt  is “1” if person i worked in industry j in year t and its estimated 
coefficient captures the wage premium. 
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) estimated the wage premium using data from all 
industries, with industry ISIC 62 (retail sales) being the omitted category. Notice that this 
choice does not affect the results because the estimated wage premium is normalized using 
the Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997) procedure, which transforms the estimated wage 
premium into deviations in percentage terms from the employment-weighted average wage 
premium. Hence this procedure provides estimates for the omitted industry and for the wage 
premium standard errors. The inverse of the standard errors is used as a weight in the 
estimation of equations (5) and (7). 
 One important concern is that worker self-selection could be the reason behind the 
wage premium, and the specification used to estimate the wage premium does not control for 
it. The literature offers no clear solution to this problem. Gibbons and Katz (1992) 
investigated this possibility in detail and could not reject the hypothesis that the wage 
premium is not related to this endogenous worker-industry matching. On the other hand, 
Abowd et al. (1999) using matched employer-employee data found that individual specific 
effects are more important than firm effects in the wage determination. Nevertheless, if 
individuals do not move across industries, this will not pose a problem for the methodology 
used here. And this is indeed the case for Colombia, since Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) 
found little evidence of inter-industry switching by workers. Thus, if there is self-selection to 
a specific industry, it appears to be stable over time. This suggests that the time-differenced 
version of equation (5) and equation (7) will control for this self-selection issue. 
 The import tariff data at the 2-digit ISIC level are from the Colombian Planning 
Department. These data are available for only 19 industries, with manufacturing industries 
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among them, and they consist of an average of more disaggregated tariffs weighted by the 
number of product lines. The coffee price and exchange rate data are from the International 
Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (2001). The exchange rate is the nominal 
effective rate, which is a currency bundle encompassing the currencies of Colombia’s most 
important trade partners.  
 
3.2 Eslava et al. (2004) Data Set 
 In Eslava et al. (2004), the TFP is estimated with the Capital-Labor-Energy-Material 
methodology (known as KLEM, and described in detail in their paper) using firm-level data 
from the Colombian Annual Manufacturers Survey (AMS) conducted by DANE. The AMS 
contains firm-level information about the prices paid for inputs, thus providing less biased 
firm-level estimates because there is no need to rely on non-parametric methods and industry-
level price deflators as proxies for missing plant-level price data. The industry-level TFP 
series was built by aggregating firm-level TFP using production shares as weights. The 
productivity data are available only for the manufacturing sector at the ISIC 2-digit industry 
level, as shown in Table 1. The sample used in this paper was ultimately determined by the 
TFP data availability.  
 
 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used. Here we can see that the 
average import tariff decreased from 36.6% in 1986 to 13.1% in 1998. The average wage 
premium declined from 5.7% in 1986 to 2.9% in 1998, whereas the average natural logarithm 
of TFP increased from 0.332 to 0.647. These statistics suggest that the three variables of 
interest changed during the trade liberalization period. 
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4. Empirical Results 
 
In this section, I examine empirical evidence concerning the relationship among trade 
liberalization, the wage premium, and TFP, in order to estimate the bias caused by the 
omission of TFP from previous analyses in the literature. Then, I estimate additional 
regressions to assess the robustness of my results. 
To obtain an empirical estimate of the bias generated by the omission of productivity 
from previous models, the first step is to estimate the first difference of equation (5), as done 
by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) for manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries (see 
their Table 6b), but here using only manufacturing industries due to our sample restrictions. 
The results are presented in Table 3.  
The technique used in column (1) is ordinary least squares (OLS). The other columns 
present the 2SLS regressions, using as instruments the 1983 tariff level and its interactions 
with the exchange rate and coffee prices. The results in column (1) of Table 3 are exactly the 
same as those reported in Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) (see their Table 3b column (2)), since 
they are based on identical data. The estimated tariff coefficient here implies that a ten 
percentage point decrease in tariffs generates a 1.44% decline in the wage premium. In 
columns (2) to (6) the estimated tariff coefficients are positive and statistically significant at 
the 5% level in columns (4), (5), and (6), with the coefficients ranging from 0.096 to 0.199, 
and statistically significant at the 10% level in column (3), with an estimated coefficient of 
0.051. These coefficients are at least two times larger than the estimates in Goldberg and 
Pavcnik (2005) (see their Table 6b), which included all industries.  
 The excluded instruments are statistically significant in all first stage regressions, 
exhibiting an F-statistic of at least 136, which is enough to reject the null hypothesis that the 
2SLS t-test at the 5% significance level has an actual size larger than 10%. This means that 
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the t-tests conducted do not suffer from size problems due to weak instruments
11
. For all 
specifications, the null hypothesis of underidentification (the included and excluded 
instrument matrix does not have full rank) is rejected at the 5% level
12
. Although Goldberg 
and Pavcnik (2005) did not conduct over-identification tests and Hausman endogeneity tests, 
these tests are conducted here. The endogeneity tests for the 2SLS estimates do not reject the 
null hypothesis of exogeneity of tariffs for all specifications. The over-identification test for 
the specification in column (4) has a p-value of 14%, and the null hypothesis that the model is 
correctly specified is not rejected at the 10% level. In column (6), the null hypothesis is 
rejected at the 10% level of confidence. This result should make the researcher concerned 
about the existence of specification problems, which could be caused by the omission of the 
TFP. 
 Next I incorporate the natural logarithm of TFP into the econometric model to address 
the consistency problem presented in section 2. These results are reported in Table 4. The 
technique used in column (1) is OLS and the technique employed in the remaining columns is 
2SLS using the Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) instruments.  
The TFP coefficient is positive as expected and statistically significant in all models, 
with values ranging from 0.155 to 0.176. The tariff coefficient is positive in all models, but it 
is statistically significant at the 5% level only in columns (1), (4), (5), and (6). Notice that the 
lack of statistical significance for the tariff coefficient in columns (2) and (3) is also present 
in Table 3 columns (2) and (3), suggesting that this is caused by the choice of instruments 
rather than by the inclusion of TFP. 
                                                 
11
 Since these specifications contain only one endogenous regressor and less than three instruments, the Stock-
Yogo reference values for the bias of 2SLS as a fraction of OLS bias greater than 10% cannot be calculated. 
12
 The underidentification test used here is based on the Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic (Baum et al., 2007, p. 21). 
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 The instruments are statistically significant in the first stage regressions, as was also 
the case in Table 3. The estimated TFP coefficient is positive as expected in all 
specifications, but statistically significant at the 10% level only in columns (2), (3), and (5). 
 The null hypothesis of underidentification is rejected for all specifications at the 5% 
level of significance. The first stage F-statistics are above 40, which is greater than the Stock-
Yogo reference values for the actual size of 2SLS t-tests at 5% significance. These two 
econometric tests indicate that, assuming that the instruments are valid, instrument 
irrelevance does not seem to be a problem here. The null hypothesis of the over-identification 
test is not rejected for the overidentified specifications in columns (4) and (6). Lastly, for all 
2SLS specifications, the null hypothesis of exogeneity is not rejected using the Hausman test. 
The results here support the argument that the absence of TFP generates biased 
estimates of the effect of tariffs on the wage premium. When TFP is included in the estimated 
equation, the tariff coefficient decreases by 36% (column (1) of Table 4) or by 44% (column 
(6) of Table 4) relative to the specifications that exclude TFP (Table 3).  
To illustrate why this bias is important, let’s calculate the predicted change in the 
wage premium using the estimates when TFP is ignored (Table 3 column (6)) and the 
estimates when TFP is incorporated (Table 4 column (6)) evaluated at the average changes in 
the tariff (-23.5%) and TFP (31.5%) that occurred between 1986 and 1998. By ignoring TFP, 
this tariff change leads to a 3.38% decrease in the wage premium. When TFP is included, the 
tariff effect alone implies a decrease of 2.6% in the wage premium, and the TFP effect is an 
increase of 4.55% in the wage premium, resulting in a net 2.88% increase in the wage 
premium.  
According to Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005), in Colombia, the unskilled intensive 
industries suffered the largest tariff cuts. I find that the change in TFP seems to be large when 
the unskilled share is small (correlation of -0.35). The skilled-unskilled average wage 
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premium gap increases by 0.76% when TFP is ignored. When changes in TFP are 
incorporated, we can see that the gap actually increases by 0.88%, which is 15% larger than 
before. So, the current methodology underestimated the effect of trade liberalization on this 
wage inequality measure. 
 
4.1 Robustness checks 
 The correlation between TFP and import tariffs may raise concerns that there is 
multicollinearity in the regressions estimated so far. If this were the case, then in my 
theoretical framework, the majority of the tariff effect on the wage premium would occur 
through changes in TFP. Greene (2002, p. 56-57) identifies three common symptoms of 
multicollinearity. First, the estimated coefficients will have high standard errors and low 
significance levels, which is not the case with the estimates reported in Tables 3 and 4. 
Second, the estimated coefficients will have the wrong signs or implausible magnitudes, 
which again are not the case with the estimates reported in Tables 3 and 4. Third, small 
changes in the data will lead to large swings in the estimated coefficients. I re-estimated the 
models by excluding one year at a time and the estimated coefficients did not exhibit any 
large change, either in magnitude or in the standard errors.
13
 
 The number of clusters (nine manufacturing industries) in the data set is small and, 
according to simulations performed by Cameron et al. (2008), this can produce estimates of 
the coefficients’ standard errors that are biased downward. Unfortunately, the number of 
clusters cannot be increased because nine manufacturing industries is the finest level of 
disaggregation that can be obtained from the Colombian household surveys. To address this 
concern I re-estimated all specifications using a pairs bootstrap with the bootstrap-se 
procedure (Cameron et al. 2008, p. 416) that randomly resample at the cluster level. It means 
                                                 
13
 These results are available from the author upon request. 
 18 
that if the j-th cluster is selected, then all observations in that cluster will be in the resample. 
An important aspect is how to incorporate the sample weights in the resampling procedure, 
given these weights vary over time within cluster. Unfortunately, the literature does not 
provide guidance on how to procedure in this special case. I chose the naïve strategy of 
ignoring weights in the bootstrap exercise. The results are displayed in Table 5. 
 First, I estimated the first difference of equation (5) by OLS, column (1), and then by 
2SLS, columns (2) and (3). The tariff coefficients are positive, but statistically significant 
only in column (3) and at the 5% level. The null hypotheses of underidentification and of 
exogeneity of the tariff cannot be rejected at the 10% level for both columns (2) and (3). In 
the first stage of the 2SLS estimates, only in column (2) the excluded instruments are 
statistically significant. The first stage F-statistic is larger than the Stock-Yogo reference 
values only in column (2).  
 Next I re-estimated equation (7). The results for the OLS estimate are reported in 
Table 5 column (4). The tariff coefficient is positive and not statistically significant at the 
10% level. Notice that it is smaller than its Table 5 column (1) counterpart. The TFP 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. The test of joint 
significance of the tariff and TFP rejects the null hypothesis that both coefficients are equal to 
zero at the 5% level.  
The 2SLS estimates of equation (7) in columns (5) and (6) also presented a positive 
and statistically significant coefficient for TFP, and a positive and not statistically significant 
coefficient for tariff. Again, the estimated tariff coefficients are smaller than their 
counterparts in columns (2) and (3) as expected. The null hypothesis that both the TFP and 
tariff coefficients are zero is rejected at the 5% level for columns (5) and (6). 
In the first stage regression, the excluded instruments are statistically significant only 
in column (5). The TFP coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level in 
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column (5) and at 10% level in column (6). The null hypothesis of underidentification is 
rejected at the 5% level in both cases. The first-stage F-statistic is larger than the Stock-Yogo 
reference value only for column (5). The null hypothesis of exogeneity of tariffs cannot be 
rejected at the 5% level of confidence for columns (5) and (6).  
 The results in Table 5 provide support to the Table 4 findings. Adding TFP to the 
estimated model resulted in statistically significant TFP coefficients in both the first and 
second stage of the 2SLS regressions, and in smaller estimated tariff coefficients, as 
predicted. At the end of the day, the inclusion of TFP appears to make an important 
difference on the estimated effect of tariffs on wage premium. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
 This paper has assessed a major weakness of the current methodology used to 
estimate the effect of import tariffs on the wage premium: the omission of total factor 
productivity from the estimated model. This omission invalidates the instrument commonly 
used in the literature, the pre-trade reform import tariff level, because TFP is positively 
correlated with both the wage premium and the import tariff setting. This implies a 
correlation between the error term and the excluded instrument, and thus leads to inconsistent 
estimates of the tariff’s effect on the wage premium.  
 When the change in TFP is incorporated into the estimated specification, the results 
reveal that TFP does indeed positively affect the wage premium directly, and, as an included 
instrument, also has a positive correlation with the change in tariffs, the endogenous regressor 
in the estimated model. I find that a 10 % increase in TFP leads to a 1.6% increase in the 
wage premium. The estimated effect of the import tariff is positive, and a ten percentage 
point decrease in import tariffs decreases the wage premium by 1.1%, which is about 36% 
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smaller than the estimates obtained in previous studies, which omitted productivity from the 
methodology.  
 One consequence of the use of biased estimates from previous studies is that in the 
Colombian case, the omission of TFP resulted in a smaller estimated increase in the gap 
between the average wage premium for skilled and unskilled workers, which leads to an 
underestimation of the increase in inequality due to changes in the wage premium.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Figure 1 – Relationship between industry-level 1983 tariff and the 1998-1984 change in tariff 
for Colombian manufacturing industries (ISIC 31-39). 
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Table 1 – List of Colombian manufacturing industries according to ISIC Rev. 2 classification.  
 
 
ISIC Rev. 2 code Industry description 
31 Manufacture of Food, Beverages and Tobacco 
32 Textile, Wearing Apparel and Leather Industries 
33 Manufacture of Wood and Wood Products, Including Furniture 
34 Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products, Printing and Publishing 
35 Manufacture of Chemicals and Chemical, Petroleum, Coal, Rubber and 
Plastic Products 
36 Manufacture of Non-Metallic Mineral Products, except Products of 
Petroleum and Coal 
37 Basic Metal Industries 
38 Manufacture of Fabricated Metal Products, Machinery and Equipment 
39 Other Manufacturing Industries 
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Table 2 - Descriptive statistics of variables for manufacturing industries (ISIC 31-39)  
 
Year 1986-1998 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Wage premium  0.040 0.064 -0.096 0.175 
Tariff 0.216 0.122 0.075 0.501 
1983 tariff 0.401 0.145 0.235 0.732 
Coffee Prices 84.314 25.954 42.6 129 
Coffee Prices * 1983 tariffs 33.775 16.449 10.007 94.377 
Exchange Rate 106.714 22.175 75.5 151.3 
Exchange Rate*1983 tariff 42.748 18.086 17.736 110.692 
Log(TFP) 0.511 0.257 -0.039 1.138 
ΔWage premium -0.002 0.053 -0.111 0.168 
ΔTariff -0.053 0.079 -0.408 0.007 
Δlog(TFP) 0.056 0.083 -0.102 0.277 
Number of observations 63 63 63 63 
Where Δwage premium = wage premiumt – wage premiumt-2, with analogous formulas for 
the other variables. 
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Table 3 – First difference of equation (5) estimated using OLS and 2SLS estimators with TFP 
omitted  
 
Technique OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
2
nd
 Stage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
ΔTariff 0.144** -0.007 0.051* 0.168** 0.096** 0.199** 
  (0.038) (0.033) (0.028) (0.032) (0.032) (0.044) 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 63 63 63 63 63 63 
1
st
 Stage       
1983 Tariff  -0.170**  0.951**  0.299** 
  (0.007)  (0.144)  (0.115) 
Exchange rate* 
1983Tariff    -0.002** -0.010**   
   (0.000) (0.001)   
Coffee Price* 1983Tariff     -0.002** -0.006** 
      (0.000) (0.001) 
Underidentification test  711.61** 338.48** 2641** 172.47** 2065** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
1
st
 stage F-statistic  561.12 266.90 1022 136 799.5 
Stock-Yogo reference 
values 10% max. IV size  16.38 16.38 19.93 16.38 19.93 
Over-identification     2.177  2.815* 
Test    [0.140]  [0.093] 
Endogeneity test  1.757 1.472 0.133 0.631 0.557 
   [0.185] [0.225] [0.715] [0.427] [0.456] 
Dependent variable is Δwage premium, where Δwage premium = wage premiumt – wage 
premiumt-2, with analogous formulas for the other variables. Robust standard errors are clustered at 
the industry level, and are reported in parentheses. p-values are reported in brackets. Sample 
weights are the inverse of the estimated wage premium standard error. 
**, * indicates statistical significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  
28 
Table 4 – First difference of equation (7) estimated using OLS and 2SLS estimators with TFP 
as an exogenous regressor 
Technique OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
2
nd
 Stage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
ΔLog TFP 0.160** 0.176** 0.170** 0.156** 0.164** 0.155** 
 (0.043) (0.040) (0.039) (0.038) (0.040) (0.041) 
ΔTariff 0.092** 0.037 0.058 0.106** 0.079** 0.111** 
 (0.036) (0.058) (0.039) (0.024) (0.030) (0.029) 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 63 63 63 63 63 63 
1
st
 Stage       
ΔLog TFP  0.333* 0.293* 0.097 0.250* 0.172 
  (0.167) (0.154) (0.097) (0.131) (0.114) 
1983 Tariff   -0.183**  0.867**  0.182* 
  (0.029)  (0.104)  (0.081) 
Exchange rate*1983Tariff   -0.002** -0.010**   
   (0.000) (0.001)   
Coffee Price*1983Tariff     -0.002** -0.004** 
      (0.000) (0.001) 
Underidentification   52.71** 78.44** 201.41** 76.96** 187.12** 
test  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
1
st
 stage F-statistic  40.81 60.73 76.52 59.58 71.09 
Stock-Yogo reference 
values 10% max. IV size  16.38 16.38 19.93 16.38 19.93 
Over-identification     0.956  1.603 
test     [0.328]  [0.205] 
Endogeneity test  0.804 0.623 0.001 0.108 0.028 
   [0.370] [0.430] [0.969] [0.742] [0.868] 
Dependent variable is Δwage premium, where Δwage premium = wage premiumt – wage 
premiumt-2, with analogous formulas for the other variables. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the industry level, and are reported in parentheses. p-values are reported in 
brackets. Sample weights are the inverse of the estimated wage premium standard error. 
**, * indicates statistical significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 – Equations (5) and (7) estimated by OLS and 2SLS with bootstrapped standard errors. 
Technique OLS 2SLS 2LS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
2
nd
 Stage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ΔTariff 0.188 0.129 0.283** 0.092 0.024 0.192 
 (0.120) (0.120) (0.121) (0.114) (0.135) (0.252) 
ΔLog TFP    0.172** 0.185** 0.151** 
    (0.048) (0.059) (0.046) 
Test of joint significance     17.46** 15.96** 14.98** 
for ΔTariff and ΔLogTFP    [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
1
st
 Stage       
ΔLog TFP     0.112** 0.168* 
     (0.051) (0.091) 
1983 Tariff  0.702** 0.128  0.609* 0.037 
  (0.305) (0.337)  (0.341) (0.259) 
Exchange rate*1983Tariff  -0.008**   -0.007**  
  (0.003)   (0.003)  
Coffee Price*1983Tariff   -0.003   -0.002 
   (0.004)   (0.003) 
Underidentification   29.79** 16.63**  27.71** 15.69** 
test  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] 
1
st
 stage F-statistic  24.22 9.682  20.81 8.786 
Stock-Yogo reference values       
10% max. IV size  19.93 19.93  19.93 19.93 
Over-identification  0.058 0.713  0.641 0.103 
Test  [0.810] [0.398]  [0.423] [0.748] 
Endogeneity test  0.245 0.242  0.266 0.248 
   [0.621] [0.623]  [0.606] [0.618] 
Dependent variable is Δwage premium, where Δwage premium = wage premiumt – wage 
premiumt-2,, with analogous formulas for the other variables. Year dummies included in all 
specifications. Standard errors obtained from pair bootstrap of 50 repetitions and are reported in 
parenthesis. p-values are reported in brackets. The underidentification test is based on the 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic. **, * indicates statistical significance at the 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. Number of observations is 63 for all specifications. 
 
